Pervez Musharraf’s incentives

Headlines like “India-Pak terror pact sinking fast” exasperate me. Whaddya expect? As I have written before, the India-Pakistan peace process is a charade. While it is in General Pervez Musharraf’s interest to talk peace with India, as it makes him appear responsible in the eyes of the international community, it is equally in his interest to continue the conflict, which Pakistan’s military needs for its sustenance. All talk, no walk, in other words.

Similar incentives drive Musharraf’s actions as far as the War on Terror is concerned. As I wrote here, appearing to be America’s ally gets the foreign aid flooding in (1, 2), which Pakistan’s economy desperately needs. However, if al-Qaeda and the Taliban are actually defeated, then that aid will begin to dry up, as Musharraf and Pakistan will no longer be needed so badly.

In each case, Musharraf is doing what any rational person in his place would do. The only way to solve either problem is to change his incentives. And, much as the mandarins in New Delhi may shudder at the thought, the Americans can do that far better than we can.

The next few months will be interesting.

(Some earlier posts on Musharraf.)